I found this book to be more enlightening than any book
I've ever read with the exception of Darwin's Origin of Species.
In this broad and deep book, Terrence Deacon presents a
very plausible scientific explanation of how life and mind may have emerged
from matter. It's a heavy read (about 550 pages) but there are no equations.
Deacon synthesizes the ideas from many disciplines and advances the field
with original creative insight, such as his conception of the autogen.
Life and mind are hierarchical complex dissipative far-from-equilibrium
dynamic systems (see Ilya Prigogine). Rather than starting with speculations
about consciousness, Deacon builds on a solid foundation by starting at
the bottom (atoms) and working upward (life and then mind). Lower level
dynamic systems interact and constrain each other, thus creating higher-level
dynamic systems with entirely new emergent properties. Constraints drive
nature’s creativity. Deacon emphasizes three levels of emergent dynamic
systems: Thermodynamics → Morphodynamics (form-creating systems) → Teleodynamics
(end-directed, self-creating systems). The description is more physical
than philosophical. Entropy may decrease locally but must increase globally.
Physical work must be done at the lower levels to create emergent properties
at the higher levels. Deacon generalizes the concept of work to include
higher levels of work, such as mental work, always rooted in low level
physical work.
The core of the book is Deacon's very plausible description
of how the first proto-life may have formed from non-life. In some primordial
soup, two or more types of molecules happen to catalyze the production
of each other in a cycle (autocatalysis). Furthermore, one of the molecules
in this cycle also happens to self-assemble into a simple tube or capsule
(containment). The capsule happens to capture some catalysts. When the
capsule happens to break open the cycle begins again and it replicates,
if the necessary substrate molecules are around. It's called an autogen
(or autocell).
Diagram of a hypothetical autogen (both polyhedral and tubular
forms) from Incomplete Nature. To see how it works, an animation
is even better than a diagram. Good autogen animations are here: Autogen
Demo, Neither
Ghost Nor Machine, What
Is Trying by Jeremy Sherman.
The autogen would be the first self-creating, self-maintaining
system, the first teleodynamic system, the beginning of life. It only requires
a few types of molecules and none very complicated (no RNA or DNA). Deacon
carefully points out that autocatalysis by itself is self-undermining and
containment by itself is self-undermining, but the combination of autocatalysis
and containment would be self-sustaining. Furthermore, he points out that
a simple impermeable but breakable capsule suffices; it does not require
a more complicated semi-permeable membrane as in the autopoiesis model
(see Luigi Luisi, Evan Thompson, Francisco Varela). This careful, realistic
reasoning is what makes the argument so credible. With this first self-replicating
autogen, the evolution ratchet begins. Eventually, evolution will produce
efficient living cells, with features like semi-permeable cell membranes,
energy molecules (ATP), and simple information molecules carrying signals
about the environment. Later, complex information molecules (RNA or DNA)
would evolve. The appearance of the first teleodynamic systems introduce
many abstract attributes into the physical world. Autogens are the first
(nonsentient) selves, so we can now say their parts have function, purpose,
or value, with respect to these selves. With these first selves, and especially
when autogens evolve to start using the first simple information signal
molecules, we can now say the physical world contains contentful information,
representation, and meaning, as interpreted by these selves.
The roots of mental attributes are found in these first
selves even before the evolution of neurons and brains. Higher levels of
teleodynamic systems create higher levels of emergent mental attributes:
vegetative sentience, neuronal sentience, intention, emotions, feelings,
and eventually human consciousness. Deacon does not concentrate on these
higher levels as he did in setting the foundations for the lower levels,
but he does not need to. Once you see that so many features of both life
and mind have their roots in something as simple as the autogen, the deep
mystery of the origin of life and mind is dispelled, and you can see how
the higher mental attributes will inevitably evolve by adding more layers
by the same mechanisms of emergence by constraint.
I think Deacon does not claim to completely solve
the "hard
problem" of consciousness (qualia), but he significantly advances
our understanding of sentience and consciousness, and he is able to answer
to some deep questions, such as the following.
Animal brains are sentient because they are dynamically
deep self-creating systems (they have a real self), whereas even complex
intelligent silicon-chip computers are not sentient because they
are dynamically shallow and not self-creating (they have at most a simulated
self).
Mind is not based on quantum weirdness — mind
emerges at dynamic levels higher than the quantum level.
You may have a slow start when you read this long book
because the first chapters are very abstract and the next chapters are
spent clearing away deadwood but then it gets more compelling as it builds
up, step by step, to the autogen and beyond.
If you want more about the brains and minds of higher animals
and humans, symbolic thinking, language, and information, read Deacon's
book Symbolic
Species.
Note: I'd like to give due credit to Alicia Juarrero
for her earlier (1999) groundbreaking ideas about the origin of intention
in Dynamics
in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System. I think Dynamics
in Action partially succeeded in demystifying the origin of intention,
but was missing critical pieces to the puzzle. In particular, Dynamics
in Action presents a model of life based on autocatalysis but it
misses the critical fact that autocatalysis without containment is a
self-undermining process. Without a plausible solution to the difficult
problem of how autocatalysis first becomes self-sustainable through partial
containment, the origin of intention is not fully solved.
Jeremy Sherman is a colleague of Terrence Deacon. Sherman's Neither
Ghost Nor Machine is primarily a briefer, but not too brief (it's
about 265 pages), presentation of main ideas in Deacon's Incomplete
Nature, namely, the nature and origin of selves and aims. I think
it succeeds: it is shorter and easier to read than Incomplete Nature but
it fully communicates most of the important ideas, except for the last
chapters of Deacon's book. If you're not going to read Incomplete
Nature, then you'll do very well to read Neither Ghost Nor Machine instead.
Sherman's writing is easy to read. He uses more familiar
terms than does Deacon, for example "aims" rather than "ententional
phenomena", "the second law [of thermodynamics]"
rather than "homeodynamics", "emergent regularization" rather
than "morphodynamics", and "emergent self-regeneration" rather
than "teleodynamics".
The organization of the book loosely follows Incomplete
Nature. Sherman starts with a helpful overview telling you where
we're headed. Next, he clearly frames the question. He points out some
traps to avoid, such as supernaturalism, eliminativism, or equivocation.
Then he builds to the solution by explaining emergence through constraints,
and the hierarchical levels of dynamic systems: second law → emergent
regularization → emergent self-regeneration. Emergent self-regeneration
has capacities for self-repair, self-protection, and self-regeneration.
Before presenting Deacon's autogen solution to the origin
of life, Sherman first explains why some of the competing models, such
as the RNA World model with uncontained RNA and the autopoiesis model with
a semi-permeable membrane (see Luigi Luisi, Evan Thompson, Francisco Varela),
don't quite solve the problem.
Sherman's description of Deacon's autogen is in some ways
more complete than that given in Incomplete Nature. He elaborates
on three types of autogen conceived by Deacon: the minimal autogen, the
selective autogen with an ability to sense its environment, and the template
autogen with internal information molecules simpler than RNA or DNA. The
book has helpful diagrams for all these types of autogen.
Then, as Sherman puts it, "emergent with the autogen
are the essential abstract features of life all rolled into one, and there
are many such features", such as good-bad, self-other, foresight,
and memory.
There's a section about how information is interpreted
by selves. He describes three types of signs: icon, index, and symbol.
In the interest of keeping the book short, Sherman then
skips forward to discussions of the implications of the theory relating
to evolution in general and the human condition. What's missing from this
book is a step-by-step progression up the hierarchy of levels of life after
the autogen and before the human, namely unicellular organisms, plants,
and animals. He barely mentions neurons and brains, mostly skipping Incomplete
Nature's chapters on sentience and consciousness. This omission is
defensible because the roots of mental attributes are already present in
the first self, so the mystery of origins of mind has already been addressed.
Sherman barely mentions Deacon's generalized concept of
work, an entire chapter in Incomplete Nature.
Sherman sometimes ventures into talking about quantum theory,
but you may ignore these tangents. As he says, "the key appears to
be available within classical physics and chemistry ... not the quantum
scale."
As to free will, Sherman says "free or not, will emerges
as a self and its aims" — in other words, we can only discuss will with
respect to selves, not with respect to the universe. I take this to mean
that one's will may be free with respect to one's own life, regardless
of whether the physical universe is deterministic or not.
The sections are: I. Overview, II. Framing the Mystery,
III. Dead Ends, Live Clues, IV. Grounding a Solution, V. Deacon's Solution,
VI. The Interpreting Self, VII. Implications.
